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Introduction 
As the challenges in contemporary civil societies got increasingly complex, the public sector became 
more dependent upon nonprofits and other private organizations for implementing its social policies 
(Salamon 1995). When tackling so-called ‘wicked issues’ (e.g. health care, poverty or homelessness) 
both the public and private sectors acknowledge that considerable resource dependencies do occur 
and that working independently is not enough (Rittel and Webber 1973; Agranoff and McGuire 2001; 
Klijn 2008). As a matter of fact, these problems defy precise definition and generally cut across policy 
and service areas (Clarke and Stewart 1997). It has therefore been argued that new and innovative 
ways of thinking are required that are highly flexible and more inclusive (Alter and Hage 1993; 
Huxham and Vangen 1996). The concept of network structures, as an alternative to traditional 
hierarchical governance or coordination through market mechanisms, is at the forefront of this move 
(Powell 1990; O’Toole 1997; Kickert and Koppenjan 1997). The prevailing view amongst governments 
and the private organizations is that, by integrating  services through a network of providing 
agencies, clients will gain benefits of reduced fragmentation and greater coordination (Provan and 
Milward 2001). As each partner brings distinctive competencies to the collaborative endeavors, it is 
generally assumed that these structures have the ability to unlock the benefits of comparative 
advantage (Gazley and Brudney 2007; Andrews and Entwistle 2010). 
Today, it is widely acknowledged that these networks operate within a notion of governance (Klijn 
2008). There is a persuasive, shared, global perception of governance as a topic far broader than 
‘government’. In general terms, governance is seen as a new process or method by which society is 
governed (Rhodes 1996). It refers to the development of governing styles in which boundaries 
between and within the public and the private sectors have become blurred (Stoker 1998). The 
essence of governance is its focus on mechanisms that do not rest on the authority and sanctions of 
government (Rhodes 1997; Peters & Pierre 1998). Governance is most often presented as an attempt 
to improve coordination between relatively independent actors and it primarily involves the 
horizontal steering or relations across networks (Klijn 2008). 
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However, as networks, and governance through networks, are rapidly becoming new buzzwords in 
the public sector, there is a risk that these concepts lose their edge and become synonymous with all 
forms of collaboration between the public and private sector (Frederickson 2005). Therefore, the 
study of networks must build on rigorous definitions.  
This paper draws upon a definition of networks as a group of organizations, both public and private 
ones, which have a stake in a problem and seek mutually determined solutions they could not 
achieve by working alone (Peters 1998; Sink 1998). Although we agree that network members retain 
independent decision-making powers, it is generally assumed that each party is, to some or lesser 
extent, dependent upon resources controlled by another, and that there are gains to be had by 
pooling these resources (Powell 1990; Wood and Gray 1991). This equally implies that network 
participants are tied by a form of structural interdependence in which one unit is not the subordinate 
of others by virtue of its formal position (O’Toole 1997). Instead, members rather see themselves as 
a unique piece of a total issue making them eager to develop synergies and to bring together the 
specific resources and competencies from different sectors (Lowndes and Skelcher 1998; Keast, 
Mandell, et.al. 2004; Entwistle and Martin 2005).  
In recent years a substantial amount of research, both from a quantitative and a qualitative 
perspective, has been conducted on the structural and operational characteristics of these networks. 
Still, surprisingly less attention has been paid to the actual effectiveness of such networks (Provan 
and Milward 2001; Turrini, Christofoli et.al. 2009). It has already been stated that the literature on 
collaboration through networks is often celebratory and only rarely cautious (Berry et al. 2004). So, 
after a period of network euphoria, during which the presence of networks was considered as 
something positive per se, we might now face questions as to whether and under what conditions 
networks are actually performing at a level that justifies the costs of collaboration, which can be very 
substantial (Kenis and Provan 2009).  
By creating a framework for conducting qualitative case studies this paper will address the issue of 
network effectiveness into more detail. When searching for key determinants of network 
effectiveness, the focus will be on the network management activities performed by a central 
steering agency within the network. In other words, we question whether networks are actually 
capable of unlocking these distinctive competencies in practice, and if so, how network management 
might contribute to this. These questions will be studied against the background of the increased 
cooperation between government and the nonprofit sector for planning en delivering social services 
to citizens in a modern welfare state like Flanders, the Dutch speaking region of Belgium.  
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This paper is structured as follows. After having outlined the research context in Flanders, we 
primarily have to enhance comprehension about what effectiveness actually means and how it can 
be measured. Second, it will be explained why network management should be considered as a key 
determinant for network effectiveness. Third, a framework will be provided about how to study 
these management behaviors, as performed by a central agency within a network, in practice. 
Fourth, the research questions and methodological approach will be presented. In a final section, we 
will elaborate on how this study might contribute to the discussion on networks, network 
effectiveness and the role of a central agency in steering network activities. This will eventually result 
in some suggestions we have to bear in mind when empirically studying these questions in the near 
future.  
Setting the research context 
Starting from the overall objective to maximize the access of citizens to the range of basic social 
services they need, the Flemish Decree on local social policy (2004) aimed at increasing the 
interaction and cooperation between local governments, as being the closest level to citizens, and 
private organizations that are active on their territory. In the majority of Flemish cities we do observe 
a multitude of private actors, mostly with a nonprofit character, in the field of local social policy. This 
might be explained by two evolutions: pillarization and the intentional policy of subsidiarity. 
Pillarization has led to situation in which ideological driven ‘pillars’ (both a catholic and a pluralistic 
one) could develop dense networks of social service delivery. Subsequently, the policy of subsidiarity, 
especially by governments and politicians that are ideologically related to these pillars, made it 
possible to recognize and financially support these private initiatives in the context of the expansion 
of the welfare state during the 20
th
 century. This had made the nonprofit sector an important actor in 
the delivery of social services in Flanders.  
The collaboration, as prescribed by the Decree, must be realized both at the strategic level of policy 
development and at the operational level of service delivery. In this paper the focus is on the 
cooperation for jointly planning and/ or producing publicly funded social services. Essentially, the 
Decree must hereby be seen as a general framework, which leaves local authorities with substantial 
levels of autonomy in setting and pursuing their own social priorities. Still, the Decree equally 
suggests the creation of networks, or the formalization of existing networks, as an excellent means to 
structure the cooperation with the private nonprofit sector. Hence, in every Flemish municipality, we 
recently witnessed the emergence of network structures that have been established around 
particular policy issues such as child care facilities, elderly care, homelessness, etc.  
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Furthermore, the Decree also entails a more tactical component by assigning local authorities with a 
task to operate as a central agency steering and coordinating the actions of the different public and 
private actors involved in these networks. Still, it must be stated that in Flanders, from a historical 
perspective, there are two democratically legitimized public actors at this local level that are both 
key players in the field of local social policy. Each municipality has its elected local council and also 
one public center for social welfare (OCMW), whose council is indirectly elected by the city council. 
Starting from its legal mission to guarantee the social welfare of all citizens in the municipality, the 
OCMW may for example organize its own facilities (e.g. in elderly care, child care, hospitals, etc.). As 
local councils are obliged to take care of all problems of ‘local concern’, including the social issues, 
the coordination of activities and priorities within the public sector could be seen as a prerequisite 
for effective coordination with the private nonprofit sector. In this paper we will, however, not 
specifically address this issue of coordination between the local council and OCMW. From a historical 
perspective, it could be argued that in some municipalities the local council will be the dominant 
actor dealing with social issues, while in others the OCMW will perform a far more broader role. We 
argue that it is less important which actor does actually perform a role as central agency in steering 
the local social policy, than the point that this mutual agreement must be established. In the 
remainder of this paper we will therefore refer to local government, albeit the local council or the 
OCMW, as the steering actor.  
The complex task of evaluating network effectiveness 
Despite problems regarding conceptualization and measurement, a reasonable analysis of network 
effectiveness is critical to justify the support of those organizations that make up the network, those 
who are served by the network and those whose policy and funding actions affect the network 
(Provan and Milward 2001;  Provan and Kenis 2007). As the evaluation of network effectiveness is at 
the center of interest in this paper, a framework must be provided in order to understand what 
effectiveness means and to determine the criteria that must be considered in its assessment (Provan 
and Milward 2001; Kenis and Provan 2009). This paper draws upon insights derived from an 
extensive review of literature on network effectiveness and its determinants (for an overview see for 
example Provan, Fish et.al. 2007; Turrini, Christofoli et.al. 2009). More specifically, it is argued that 
any study targeting network effectiveness should address two basic questions: what are the levels of 
analysis to evaluate network effectiveness and what are the criteria through which network 




First, concerning the level of analysis, the problem of evaluating networks is notably acute in view of 
the multiple stakeholders that can and do lay claim to the organizations that comprise a network. 
The most important question is then ‘effectiveness for whom’, because various actors and 
organizational entities could and will be influenced by the network’s behavior (Provan and Kenis 
2007). Consistent with this multiple-stakeholder perspective we follow Provan and Milward (2001) 
who argue that networks might be evaluated at three levels of analysis: the community level, the 
network itself and the level of network’s organizational participants. First, at the broadest level, 
networks must be judged by the contribution they make to the communities they are trying to serve. 
Thus, networks must be evaluated as service-delivery vehicles that provide value to local 
communities, and especially the pool of clients it serves, in ways that could have not been achieved 
through the uncoordinated provision of services by fragmented and autonomous agencies. To 
appreciate the network’s contribution we could focus on the quality and effectiveness of the 
provided services to clients (e.g. in terms of service accessibility, service utilization, client well-being). 
Second, the network itself must become a viable interorganizational entity if it is to survive (Provan 
and Milward 2001). This refers implicitly to the sustainability, legitimacy and maintenance of the 
networked structure per se (Turrini, Christofoli, et.al. 2009). Effectiveness at this network level can 
be assessed in a number of different ways: by analyzing the ebb and flow of agencies to and from the 
network; the extent to which services that are actually needed by clients are provided by the 
network; the strength of the relationships between and among network members or by the presence 
of a central administrative structure (Provan and Milward 2001). Third, network effectiveness might 
be evaluated at the organizational level. It is important to recognize that individual agencies and 
their managers will still, at least partly, be motivated by self-interest. Networks can contribute 
significantly to organization-level outcomes such as resource acquisition, enhanced levels of 
legitimacy, reduced costs and improved client outcomes (Provan and Milward 2001). Accordingly, it 
could be necessary to consider the expectations of network participants about these network 
outcomes, and more specifically, their perception of the evolution of the expected advantages (e.g. 
increased ability to serve clients, increased ability to acquire additional resources, etc.) and the 
potential drawbacks (increased efforts in time and resources, loss of autonomy, etc.) (Provan et.al. 
2005).  
Second, regardless of the level on which effectiveness is studied, differences in operationalization 
and measurement of network effectiveness might equally depend on the focus on the criteria 
through which effectiveness is measured (Kenis and Provan 2009). Three measures related to the 
functioning of the network are of particular importance: the network structure, network processes or 
the network outcomes (Cristofoli and Maccio 2011).  
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As far as network structure is concerned, networks can be considered successful when they are able 
to survive in the long term by gaining high reputation from internal and external stakeholders 
(Provan and Milward 2001). This ensures for example clients with the possibility to access at services 
in a stable way and at the network partners the possibility of systematically exploiting network 
advantages. Mandell and Keast (2008) consider the willingness to continue investing resources in the 
network activity by critical stakeholders. When turning to the processes, networks can be considered 
successful when the partner collaboration does work (Cristofoli and Maccio 2011). This is especially 
the case when collaboration leads to the creation of a new organizational form, existing in se and 
independently from the network partners (Keast et.al. 2004; Mandell and Keast 2008). Finally, 
concerning the network outputs, networks can be considered as successful when they are able to 
reach their expected objectives. In general, the expected outputs of public networks can be 
expressed in terms of improved efficiency, effectiveness and equity (Provan and Milward 2001; 
Provan and Kenis 2007).  
In the remainder of this paper network effectiveness is then defined as the attainment of positive 
network-level outcomes that could not normally be achieved by individual organizational participants 
acting independently. First, we follow Kenis and Provan (2009) who argue that public networks 
should best be evaluated at the network level. The critical issue for both clients and funders most 
often lies in the performance of the network as a whole and not whether some organizations that 
are part of the network do a better job than others in providing a particular component of service 
(Provan and Milward 2001). Obviously, a network may be ineffective if individual organizations 
within the network do a poor job. But in addition, even though network organizations may provide 
excellent services on their own, overall network outcomes may be rather low (Provan and Milward 
1995). Second, we focus on criteria of network effectiveness that are related to the outcomes of the 
network activities (Provan and Milward 1995; Provan and Kenis 2007; Kenis and Provan 2009). The 
specific network-level outcome will depend on the particular constituency assessing the functioning 
of the network. This implies that no certain outcome will be considered a priori as the correct one 
because each represents a potentially valid point of view. Such criteria might for example include 
goal attainment; the productivity of the network; the quality of care; equity or the improved 
integration of critical services to vulnerable populations. As every criterion can be considered as a 
‘norm’, this implies that any decision about these criteria used in assessing the performance of a 
network is in fact a normative decision. There is no scientific way to judge whether one criterion is 




Network management as a determinant for effectiveness 
Throughout literature a substantial amount of structural, contextual and functional characteristics 
have been identified as key determinants for explaining network effectiveness. Instead of providing a 
complete overview of all these factors (see for example Provan, Fish et.al. 2007; Turrini, Christofoli 
et.al. 2009) this paper contributes to the debate on network effectiveness by focusing on one 
particular determinant: the network management by a central organization. The rationale behind 
this choice is threefold: the expected link between management activities and effectiveness; the 
crucial role of central agencies in performing these management tasks; and finally the particular 
position of public agencies in steering network activities.  
First of all, a series of recent analysis, both through case-studies as large-N studies, have shown fairly 
strong correlations between network management activities and network effectiveness (Meier & 
O’Toole 2001; Agranoff & McGuire 2003; Klijn 2008; Klijn & Edelenbos 2010). In general terms, 
network management may help to avoid four pitfalls: repetition, omission, divergence and 
counterproduction (Huxham 2003). Avoidance of repetition has, at its most obvious level, to do with 
the efficient use of resources due to the fact that organizations are often involved in partially 
overlapping activities (e.g. building up databases, etc.). In practice, the management of repetition 
seems to involve making a judgment about where repetition is valuable and where it is wasteful. The 
avoidance of omission is concerned with ensuring that activities which collaborating organizations 
regard as important do not get overlooked. Omission could for example occur when the activity is 
the responsibility of more than one organization so that each assumes that the other is doing it. 
Avoidance of divergence is concerned with ensuring that resources are used towards common goals 
rather than diluted across a range of activities. Finally, counterproduction has to do with 
organizations working in isolation and taking actions which conflict with those taken by others.  
Second, scholars have pointed to the presence of a core agency coordinating network activities as a 
critical determinant for network effectiveness. This finding was especially apparent in the work of 
Provan and Milward (1995) who used comparative case studies of mental care networks in four large 
cities in the US to investigate whether the success of the network depended on the structure of 
community-based networks for mental illness or the context in which they operate. Network 
effectiveness was assessed at the client level, as being a combination of the actual improvement of 
the client’s health status and client’s well-being as perceived by two types of stakeholders in the 
network – families and therapists. Provan and Milward focused on two categories of determinants, 
the context of the network (e.g. in terms of stability and resource munificence) and the structural 
characteristics of the network.  
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For the purpose of this paper, especially the latter category is of particular importance. It was found 
that the presence of a central agency, acting as mediator and facilitator for coordinating network 
activities, was a critical factor for enhancing overall network effectiveness (Provan and Milward 
1995). Subsequent empirical studies seemed to confirm that integration that happens through a 
central actor, aiming at improving coordination and cohesion among network members, is more 
effective than integration defined through multi-lateral interactions (Provan and Sebastian 1998; 
Conrad 2003). In that respect, Huxham (2003) has pointed to the issue of leadership ‘that makes 
things happen’ within networks.  
Third, even if collaboration through networks may rely on various leaders performing different roles 
at various times, it has been stated that governments are ultimately held accountable for the 
satisfactory delivery of public goods and services to citizens (Kickert 1997; McGuire 2006). 
Governments are core actors because they continue to possess a legitimacy to approach public 
problems and retain important legal authority to set rules and norm. Furthermore, they contribute 
financial resources to programs (Agranoff 2003). So, in the typical context of collaborative public 
management, public managers can’t always command action, but they are still responsible for their 
collaborative outcomes (McGuire 2002). Network management therefore is a crucial task for public 
agencies.  
Considering the above arguments, this paper argues that the case of the local social policy in Flanders 
is very suitable to find out whether the management by a central agency will enhance the overall 
effectiveness of the network. More specifically, we will determine the capacity and willingness of 
local authorities in Flanders to perform this complex role as a director in steering cooperation with 
private actors within network structures. As outlined before, local governments have been recently 
assigned with a task in enhancing cooperation with the private nonprofit suppliers on their territory 
and to perform a central role in managing and steering network activities and joint efforts.  
Towards a framework for network management 
Despite the growing recognition, both by scholars and practioneers, of the importance of managing 
network activities questions remain on whether what these concrete tasks are and how to measure 
them. This is particularly difficult because the allocation of managerial resources in network 
structures might sometimes be rather fluid as the utilization of management behaviors may vary 
across time and space within in a given project. Emphasizing for example the inner stabilization of 
the network means that, in that particular time and place, less attention can be given to exploiting 
new opportunities for the network. This variation in the distribution of managerial resources makes 
observations and identification of this behavior somewhat problematic (McGuire 2002).  
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Within the literature several attempts have been made to provide a useful framework for the 
operationalization of network management. In a study on central government agencies within 
networks, Keast (2003) identifies that central agencies operate at two levels.  First, at the strategic 
level, governments take on the roles that are needed to provide a foundation for any of the 
networked arrangements to be able to proceed and to be sustained. In general, these strategic roles 
are providing legitimacy, risk taking and direction setting. A key aspect of this latter role of providing 
the overall policy direction lies in the specification of the outcomes that were to be achieved 
(Waterhouse and Keast 2011). Hence, network managers must have a perspective that is broader 
than their own organization (Rethemeyer and Hatmaker 2007). Second, at the operational level, 
central agencies adopt more finely tuned functional roles aimed at providing the mechanisms by 
which networks function on a day to day basis. Here, the roles include enabler, facilitator and 
catalyst. Enabling refers to a ‘hands off’ rule in the setting up of the conditions that allow others to 
develop certain outcomes. Facilitating is a ‘hands on’ role where government brokers relationships 
and breaks through barriers of resistance. A catalyst role is where government temporarily adopts a 
‘hands on’ role in network operations only becoming involved in their operation when absolutely 
necessary and as a means to initiate action and change. These different roles for central agencies do 
not occur in isolation meaning that a major consideration for government operators within networks 
is to determine the appropriate format of their engagement to ensure network effectiveness. 
By reviewing theoretical and evidence-based studies on network effectiveness Turrini, Christofoli 
et.al. (2009) identified four ‘functioning’ characteristics as emerging concepts influencing the overall 
network effectiveness. First, there is the strategic task of steering network processes that includes 
direction setting and establishing an overarching mission of the network. Second, traditional 
managerial work is related to the requirement for network managers to be able to implement 
systems and to motivate staff to perform within the network environment. Third, generic networking 
is seen as the ability to effectively interact with individuals outside a manager’s direct line of control. 
Finally, buffering instability (or nurturing stability) involves being able to solve tensions among 
partners in order to strengthen ‘bridges’ among the participating organizations (Kickert et.al. 1997). 
For the purpose of this paper especially this latter category will be of particular interest. These 
linkages or bridges are built by seeking formal adjustments by the parties through bargaining and 
negotiating (Agranoff and McGuire 2003). In strengthening the network’s inner stability, network 
managers can create the environment for favorable and productive interactions: they engender 
participation, they promote information exchange, they maintain harmony and they develop ways to 
cope with strategic and operational complexity (Kickert et al 1997; Agranoff and McGuire 2001).  
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Kickert and Koppenjan (1997) differentiate network managerial tasks according to three general 
activities: intervening in existing patterns of interaction and restructuring relationships, furthering 
the conditions for cooperation through consensus building, and joint problem solving. They argue 
that these strategies occur in the process of both game management and network structuring. Game 
management involves activating the network by deciding who should be involved and who not, 
arranging interaction, brokering to match problems and facilitating interaction. Network structuring 
involves influencing formal policy, influencing interrelationships, influencing values and perceptions 
and mobilizing coalitions. 
Still, the categorization of network behaviors is less important than the point that it is necessary to 
determine how and why to use such behaviors. However one categorizes behaviors, the different 
management resources allocated by managers are nearly seamless in their applicability. This stems 
from the fact that multiple behaviors are utilized in network settings (McGuire 2002). Furthermore, 
such network skills are not that unique, as there are similarities with the skills required for managing 
single organizations (McGuire 2006).  
In this paper we therefore rely on a framework developed by Robert Agranoff and Michael McGuire 
and based upon an extensive review of literature on network management and effectiveness. These 
management behaviors were organized into four distinct categories (activation, framing, mobilizing 
and synthesizing) and are relatively familiar to the operational categorization of Kickert, et.al. (1997) 
as outlined above.  
Activation refers to a set of behaviors employed for identifying and incorporating the right persons 
and the resources they possess (such as finances, information, expertise, legal authority, etc.) on 
which the collaborative effort depends in order to attain its goals (Lipnack and Stamps 1994; 
McGuire 2006). One important criterion for determining who becomes involved in the collaboration 
may be that the member agencies offer resources that other agencies lack. Activation is a critical 
component of network management because resources such as money, information and expertise 
can be integrating mechanisms of networks (McGuire 2006).  
Framing the interaction between network participants is defined as the set of behaviors used to 
arrange and integrate a network structure by facilitating agreement on participants’ roles, operating 
rules and network values. Compared to activation, framing is perhaps a more subtle task. Network 
managers must arrange, stabilize, nurture and integrate the network structure (O’Toole 1997). 
Framing involves facilitating the internal structure and position of the participants as well as 
influencing the operating rules and norms of the network (Mandell 1990; Kickert and Koppenjan 
1997). A manager can frame the network context by introducing new ideas and thereby creating a 
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shared purpose or vision (Lipnack and Stamps 1994; O’Toole 1997). In this regard managers might 
offer suggestions for looking at a problem differently. Managers can do this by facilitating agreement 
on leadership roles, helping to establish an identity and culture for the network, assisting in 
developing working structures and altering the perceptions of participants to understand the unique 
characteristics of working with persons in contexts without organizational mechanisms based in 
authority relations.  
Mobilizing behavior is intended to induce commitment to the joint undertaking and to build support 
from both key players outside the collaboration and those who are directly involved (Innes and 
Booher 1999). Mobilization is an ongoing task for achieving network effectiveness. Managers build 
support by mobilizing organizations and coalitions and by forging an agreement on the role and the 
scope of network operations (Mandell 1990; Kickert, Klijn et al 1997). A manager must sell an idea to 
potential network participants to secure this commitment and support for the network (Gray 1989; 
Mandell 1990). Mobilizing requires a view of the strategic whole and an ability to develop and 
achieve a set of common objectives based on this whole (Mandell 1988).  
By synthesizing the network managers create the environment and enhance the conditions for 
favorable, productive interaction among network participants. Managers must find a way to blend 
the various participants, each with conflicting goals or different perceptions or dissimilar values, to 
fulfill the strategic purpose of the network. The network manager must seek to achieve cooperation 
while preventing, minimizing or removing blockages. Important management behavior then includes 
facilitating and furthering interaction and linkages among participants (Kickert and Koppenjan 1997; 
O’Toole 1997) or reducing complexity and uncertainty by promoting information exchange among 
participants (Innes and Booher 1999; O’Toole 1988). These ties are created by establishing both 
formal communication channels and informal channels through face-to-face interaction, coordinating 
activities across organizations, and building relationships as a means to share knowledge and create 
trust (Goldsmith and Eggers 2004).  
In this paper it will be hypothesized that local governments in Flanders, performing an imposed role 
as central agency within a network with private nonprofit suppliers, will make deliberate choices in 
order to allocate their managerial resources. These public agencies will have to fulfill, to some or 
lesser extent, a role in activating the right actors, in framing the interaction between network 
participants, in inducing sufficient levels of commitment and in creating a favorable environment for 




Research questions and methodology 
When considering the above arguments on networks, network effectiveness and its determinants, 
we will address four research questions in our empirical study:  
1) Which are the network-level objectives that have been formulated by the different actors in 
the network?  
2) To what extent are these network-level objectives realized in practice?  
3) Which are the different categories of management behaviors through which the central 
agencies exert their steering role within the network?  
4) To what extent do these categories of management behaviors contribute to the attainment 
of the network-level objectives?  
In order to study these topics this paper argues that a mixed qualitative research strategy is the most 
appropriate approach (McNabb 2002). As service delivering networks could be considered as 
contemporary social phenomena our study is interpretative as it will help us to develop (subjective) 
meanings of these social events and actions. Next, our study will also have an explanatory value by 
looking for causal explanations of these social phenomena.  
In concrete, a case study methodology is preferable to investigate such networks within their real-life 
context (Yin 2005). Cases will be selected upon both territorial and functional criteria. First, we 
delineate the scope of this research to the biggest cities in Flanders due to the fact that these are 
larger municipalities that have more resources and capacity to adequately fulfill a role in the creation 
and coordination of networks. On a functional level we are interested in the service delivering 
networks these local governments establish with private nonprofit suppliers that are active around 
two politically salient social issues in Flanders: child care and homelessness. In a first phase, a pilot 
will be conducted in one Flemish city (Kortrijk) in order to test the conceptualization and 
measurement of our key concepts. In a second phase the study will be extended to several other 
cities of comparable size as well. 
We will primarily gather basic data about these networks and all public and private actors that could 
be considered as formal members of these networks. Furthermore, a guide will be developed for 
focused discussion in the field. The preliminary conceptual framework on networks, network 
effectiveness and its determinants, as it was already outlined in the previous chapters, will hereby 
serve as a good starting point (Agranoff 2007). After having pretested our guide, semi-structured 
interviews will be conducted with one representative per organization, which preferably perform a 




This paper aimed at providing a framework to study whether network management, as performed by 
a central (public) agency, would be a key determinant in explaining the overall effectiveness of 
networks in which public and private actors interact for implementing public policies. This objective 
gains particular importance due to the worldwide emergence of network structures in order to solve 
so-called ‘wicked issues’ by jointly planning and providing publicly funded social services to citizens. 
More specifically, the above questions were put against the background of the debate on local social 
policy in Flanders. The recently launched Decree on local social policy hereby asks local governments 
to enhance cooperation with the private nonprofit suppliers through networks and to fulfill a 
coordinating role in steering network activities. Despite the provisional absence of empirical data we 
argue that this paper is able to make a twofold contribution. On the one hand we add some relevant 
insights to the debate on network effectiveness and its determinants. On the other hand we are able 
to shed a light on some practical implications for anyone targeting at empirically studying these 
networks.  
About network effectiveness 
First, scholars have repeatedly taken for granted that networks do have the ability to unlock the 
distinctive competencies of the different sectors involved in this collaborative effort (McGuire 2006). 
Still, as argued before, surprisingly little attention has been paid to the actual performance or 
effectiveness of these networks (Provan and Milward 2001; Christofoli, Turrini, et.al. 2009). This gap 
is partly due to the problems in conceptualization and measurement of effectiveness (Provan and 
Kenis 2007). Some recent studies have pointed out that collaborative structures between the public 
and the private nonprofit sector could also be unrelated to performance (Andrews and Entwistle 
2010) or might even result in failures (Provan et.al. 2007). In a similar vein, Vangen and Huxham 
(2003) have referred to ‘collaborative inertia’ as participants in a collaborative endeavor might not 
agree on common aims, the amount of power is unequally distributed and the building of trust 
seems to more problematic than expected. In general terms, when studying networks, we must be 
aware of the fact that these structures do not always provide positive outcomes. The study 
presented in this paper might help to fill in this gap by assessing network effectiveness as the extent 
to which network-level objectives are realized in practice.  
Second, we assessed effectiveness as the attainment of positive network-level outcomes that could 
not normally be achieved by individual organizational participants acting independently. Such criteria 
might for example include goal attainment, the productivity of the network, the quality of care, 
equity or the improved integration of critical services to vulnerable populations. Still, we agreed that 
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no certain outcome should be considered a priori as the correct one because each represents a 
potentially valid point of view (Kenis and Provan 2009). This raises questions about the extent to 
which the criteria through which respondents from both sectors in our study will assess the 
effectiveness of the network are similar, or not. Next, we must also determine whether or not 
differences do occur in the extent to which both sectors perceive these expected outcomes to be 
achieved.  
A third conclusion related to the assessment of network effectiveness is that other levels of analysis 
could also be taken into consideration (Provan and Milward 2001). More specifically, we might refer 
to the outcomes at the client level (e.g. in terms of client well-being). Starting from this clients’ 
perspective, further research could be conducted to determine the effects of the network activities, 
and network management in particular, on the extent to which citizens actually have improved 
access to social services. This argument gains particular importance in our case study due to the fact 
that according to the Decree on local social policy each citizen’s right to have access to social welfare 
services must be interpreted in the most maximalist way. Or, in other words, while the overall 
effectiveness in reaching targeted objectives could be assessed in a positive (or negative) way, we 
must still wonder what this actually implies for clients and especially in terms of their social welfare 
rights.  
About network management 
In this paper we relied on a framework developed by Agranoff and McGuire (2003) to group the 
different management behaviors performed by the core agency within a network. As argued before, 
the categorization of network behaviors is perhaps less important than the need to determine how 
and why these behaviors are used in practice (McGuire 2002). This could make us wonder which 
managerial tasks are actually used by public agencies to coordinate network activities; whether some 
of these tasks are considered to be as more important than others and if differences hereby occur in 
the perceptions of the public and the private actors involved in the network. Public agencies could 
for example give priority to focus their attention on involving the right actors for the network 
(activation) or to induce sufficient levels of commitment (mobilizing), while network participants 
might prefer that the central agency increases its efforts for creating a favorable environment for 
interaction (synthesizing).  
In a similar vein, there is the question if each category of managerial behavior does equally 
contribute to the perceived levels of attainment of network-level objectives.  As shown in a recent 
study conducted by Klijn et.al. (2010) this might not always be the case. Through a quantitative 
analysis of environmental projects in the Netherlands these authors provided some insights into the 
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relationship between the type of management strategy (e.g. exploring content, connecting, arranging 
and process agreements) and both process and content outcomes. They found that different 
managerial strategies are important but that especially ‘connecting’, which is closely related to our 
categorization of synthesizing, could be seen as the most promising management strategy in realizing 
outcomes.  
About the position of public agencies within the network 
The central question raised here concerns the capacity of public agencies to fulfill a coordinating role 
in networks with private sector organizations. A study of the expansion of a harbor in the 
Netherlands revealed for example that governmental organizations may not be adequately prepared 
for the movement toward managing such networked arrangements (Teisman and Klijn 2002). The 
authors found that governments do not naturally exchange information or look for mutual solutions, 
as is required for effective collaboration. This capacity of public agencies to steer interactions with 
private organizations is a particular important issue in the context of our case as well. As outlined 
before, the Decree on local social policy spurs local governments to enhance cooperation with 
private nonprofit suppliers on their territory and to take up a tactical role in coordinating these 
network activities. Still, the Decree must rather be seen as a general framework as it does not impose 
‘hard’ conditions to local governments or OCMWs about how to fulfill this role. This degree of 
autonomy must be interpreted as a way of providing local governments the possibility to respond to 
local needs. This paper argues, however, that this autonomy equally entails some problems that will 
hamper an effective coordination of network activities.  
First, core agencies might have little levers (e.g. in financial or legal terms) at their disposal to actually 
induce commitment of private organizations or to make them adjust, at least partly, their activities 
and preferences to those of others. In Flanders, it might be expected that private nonprofit 
organizations will have low levels of commitment to these core local agencies. Despite, being active 
at this local level, they primarily focus at developing strong relationships with the regional Flemish 
government for their survival. In fact, from a historical perspective, it is the Flemish government that 
recognizes these organizations and is by far their most important funding source. This equally implies 
that local governments must find other ways to induce commitment of these private actors. This 
could be done by developing a strong and appealing vision on local social policy on their territory, by 
exploring potential advantages for organizations to be involved at the local level, by developing 
common aims and by stressing interdependence between organizations within and across policy 
fields. Second, governments do not only fulfill a steering role within networks, they might also 
operate as a provider of certain social services. As governments are both actor and referee within the 
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network, questions arise about how to objectively solve tensions or discussions among network 
participants. This has also been the case in Flanders. Starting from their legal mission to guarantee 
the social welfare of all citizens in the municipality, OCMWs organize their own facilities in for 
example elderly care, child care, or hospital care. This could result in lower levels of commitment of 
network members and in decreased capacity of the core agency to perform its steering role. In order 
to solve this dualist role governments might for example chose to contract out their service 
delivering tasks. Subsequently, the opportunity has also been raised for government to hire or set up 
a separate administrative agency to govern the network (Provan and Kenis 2007). This network 
administrative organization (NAO) is  not another member organization providing its own services. 
Instead, this NAO is established, either through mandate or by the members themselves, for the 
exclusive purpose of network governance. Furthermore, Rethemeyer and Hatmaker (2007) raised the 
possibility that not only public agencies perform a steering role but that multiple network managers 
may exist within any given network. In a similar vein, it has also been stated that core agencies could 
also benefit from promoters or ‘vision keepers’, helping the core agency to implement its vision. 
These promoters are active at the working level where the links up and down have to be made. As 
actors who work with the programs on a daily basis, they have the technical knowledge to share with 
others. In this sense, these vision keepers promote the information and access to expertise within 
their agencies and help carry the work of the network (Agranoff 2003).  
About the nature of networks 
As outlined before, we rely on a definition of networks as a group of relatively autonomous actors, 
both public and private ones, who recognize that they are, to some or lesser extent, dependent upon 
each other’s resources to tackle ‘wicked issues’ in which they have a common stake and to obtain 
results that they could have not achieved by working alone. Still, it has also been argued that not all 
networks are alike (Agranoff 2003). Inevitably, reality will be more complex than any bounded 
rational model. A study on the functioning and effectiveness of networks might therefore further 
enhance our comprehension on the nature of these networks. Of particular importance is to 
determine the extent to which network participants are actually interdependent and what kinds of 
interactions they develop. We hereby could refer to a distinction made between three types of 
networks (Brown and Keast 2003; Mandell et.al. 2004). First, there is the cooperative network that 
basically involves the mere sharing of information or expertise. There is very little, if any, risk 
involved in these kinds of transactions. Each participant remains totally independent and only 
interacts with others when necessary. Second, coordinative networks go one step beyond just 
exchanging information and/ or knowledge. Network members interact with each other in order to 
improve coordination of their individual efforts. They still remain independent entities, but are 
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willing to make changes at the margins in the way they deliver services. Third, there are collaborative 
networks that are only appropriate if there is a need for participants to come together to solve a 
complex problem that they recognize they cannot solve on their own. In such collaborative network 
the participants are all interdependent and must be willing to develop new ways of thinking, 
engaging in new types of relationships and willing to make changes in existing systems. This could 
provide us with a better insight in the extent to which such networks do actually operate within a 
notion of governance with less focus on hierarchical relationships and more on developing horizontal 
linkages.  
About the importance of trust within networks 
In the absence of a legal framework imposing hard conditions, it is commonly accepted that people 
join forces and work together because of the element of trust (Agranoff and McGuire 2001). Still, it is 
very difficult to determine whether trust exists a priori and to assess its effect on collaboration 
empirically (Brass, et.al. 2004). Short of stating that increased interaction and communication 
produce trust (Goldsmith and Eggers 2004), there is no general agreement about what a public 
manager can do to build it (Agranoff 2006). This makes the management of trust somewhat 
problematic (Entwistle and Martin 2005). In many aspects, trust is both an input and an output of the 
process of building relationships. It is understood as the ability of two or more parties to a 
relationship to rely upon informal solutions to deal with risk, and its associated costs, in any new 
venture. A relational approach allows these risks and costs to be shared, minimizing the danger to 
each party the relationship and also sharing benefits (Mackintosh 2000). Thus, trust is an input into 
relationship building in the sense that no ongoing relationship will survive without it. It is an output 
in the sense that working successfully together in a relationship reinforces trust between the parties 
involved. Vangen and Huxham (2003) argue that trust is built through a cyclical trust-building loop. 
When there is no history of prior ties, partners must be willing to take some risk in order to initiate 
the collaboration and aim for realistic goals. That is, the collaboration should first take small steps 
toward some modest level of achievement. Such success then reinforces attitudes that the parties to 
the collaboration can be trusted and leads to more ambitious undertakings. The lesson for the public 
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